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I. INTRODUCTION

Reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Janus'
* Professor of Law, Boston University. It is both a pleasure and an honor to be included
in this volume of commentary on labor and employment law, assembled in recognition of the
long career and many contributions of Professor Doug Scherer. This paper is part of an issue
dedicated to Professor Scherer of Touro Law School who is retiring after a distinguished career
in both the civil rights and employment law areas. Doug has been a terrific colleague, friend,
and mentor to many - myself included - and his thoughtful work will be sorely missed. It is a
pleasure to honor him in this way given his tireless commitment to justice and opportunity for
all. Thanks to Marty Malin of Chicago-Kent School of Law for the opportunity to participate
and to Paul Vasiloff for extremely helpful research assistance.
1. Janus v. Am. Fed. State, Cty. & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
Under Illinois law, if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a
union, that union becomes the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit.
The employees are not required to join the union, but are required to pay "fair share" or
"agency" fees, which constitutes a certain percentage of full union dues. Unions may only
charge non-members for activities germane to collective bargaining. Mark Janus, employed by
the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, objects to many of the stances taken
by the union that serves as his exclusive representative, including its position concerning Illinois'
current budget crisis. As such, Janus chose not to-join the union. He is, however, required to pay
roughly $535 a year in agency fees. Believing this arrangement to be a violation of his First
Amendment rights, Janus intervened in a suit commenced by the Governor of Illinois. After the
Governor's suit was dismissed, Janus' suit was allowed to continue. Id. at 2461-62.
A majority opinion written by Justice Alito held that this agency fee provision is
unconstitutional. Id. at 2478. Agency fees amount to forcing a non-member of a union to
subsidize speech with which he or she disagrees. Id. at 2464. Under the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence, such subsidization must be subject to "exacting" scrutiny, which
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has generated intense discussion in the twenty some odd states2 that,
until recently, permitted public-sector unions to collect agency fees
from non-members. In the remaining states, unsurprisingly, reaction
to Janus has been far more muted as public-sector unions were never
permitted by state law to compel these payments.
The Court's holding - which overturned a four-decade-old
precedent 4 that authorized these payments on the ground that they
encouraged labor peace and avoided free riding by non-union
members - triggered an almost immediate response from state law
makers in my home state of Massachusetts, for example, who vowed
to help public-sector unions avoid substantial losses in revenue and
"preserve the freedom and right of every worker in Massachusetts to
join a union."' None of the responses from elected officials appeared
to make much effort to distinguish between public and private sector
unions, although almost all of the calls for a push back to Janus came
from the leaders of various public unions and members of the state
legislature.

holds that "a compelled subsidy must 'serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."' Id. at 2465 (quoting
Knox v. Serv. Employee's Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)). Illinois' agency fee
scheme could not pass that test, and as such was deemed unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. Id. The Court also took this opportunity to overrule Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, which, in 1977, held that agency fees were constitutional insofar as they did not
involve charges for political or ideological purposes. 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977). Accordingly,
agency fee arrangements nationwide are now unconstitutional.
2. Twenty-two, to be exact. Sarah Holder, Who Might be Affected Most by the Supreme
Court's Bargaining Decision, CITYLAB (June 11, 2018), <https://www.citylab.comlequity/2018
/06/should-opting-out-of-union-fees-be-a-right/562535/>.
3. Tennessee, Georgia, and North Carolina, for example, have had laws preventing such
arrangements in place since 1947. See Right-to-Work States [Interactive Map], G&A PARTNERS
(Feb. 2017), <https://www.gnapartners.com/infographic/right-to-work-states/> (scroll down to
map and hover mouse pointer over states to see dates).
4. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224 ("The governmental interests advanced by the agency-shop
provision in the Michigan statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions in
federal labor law. The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers' unions, holding
quite different views as to the proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and
grievance procedures, each sought to obtain the employer's agreement, are no different in kind
from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid. The
desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of free riders
any smaller.") (internal quotes and citations omitted).
5. Matt Stout & Jamie Halper, Legislators Weighing Bill to "Soften" Impact of Supreme
Court Ruling on Unions, BOSTON GLOBE (June 27, 2018), <https://www.bostonglobe.com/metr
o/2018/0 6 / 2 7 /court-wrong-side-history-say-state-labor-leaders/b2xovemglzwkuivebnpuon/story.
html> (quoting Barbara Madeloni, President of the Massachusetts Teachers Association).
6. See, e.g., Massachusetts Labor Responds to Janus v. AFSCME Supreme Court Ruling,
SAMPAN (June 27, 2018), <https://sampan.org/2018/06/massachusetts-labor-responds-to-janusvs-afscme-supreme-court-ruling/>.
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Indeed, true to their word, two legislators - Nick Collins' and Joe
Boncore - introduced a few weeks later' a collection of amendments
to the state's existing rules governing public employees and public
unions that were clearly designed to permit public unions to
discriminate against employees who decline to join the union.'o If
7. Mr. Collins represents South Boston, a neighborhood of the city of Boston and is,
according to his State House bio, a graduate of Babson College. Representative Nick Collins
Democrat- 4th Suffolk, 190TH GEN. CT. OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., <https://malegis

lature.gov/Lcgislators/Profile/NC1/Biography> (last visited Sept. 15, 2018).
8. Mr. Boncore represents Winthrop, a small city near Logan Airport. According to his
bio he was elected to the state senate in 2016 and attended Providence College. Get to Know
Joe, BONCORE FOR SENATE, <http://www.boncoreforsenate.com/about-joe.html> (last visited
sept. 15, 2018).
9. The proposed amendments were announced July 26, 2018. They were later withdrawn.
10. Amendment 316 ("Collins Amendment"), S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018) (on
file with author) will be described first.
Section 1 of the amendment would have amended section 1, which deals with
definitions, of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E (2017). It would insert a definition of "Nonmember," which was not present before. According to this definition, a non-member is an
employee who has not been a member of a particular union for at least one year, unless that
employee established membership with the union within thirty days of his/her initial
employment and has "consistently maintained such membership."
Section 2 of the amendment would have amended section 2, which governs collective
bargaining, of chapter 150E. Section 2 of chapter 150E gives employees the rights to join/assist a
union for the purposes of collective bargaining. This section of the amendment would have
deleted the last sentence of the paragraph, which authorizes the payment of agency fees, and
would have added a sentence that gives employees the right to refrain from union activities and
thereby be classified a "Non-member" as defined in the preceding section of Amendment 316.
Section 3 of the amendment would have amended section 3, which governs the
requirements for the formation of a bargaining unit, of chapter 150E. The first paragraph of
section 3 of chapter 150E explains that the commission decides on rules, regulations, and
procedures for determining the appropriate formation of bargaining units. One such guideline
for formation is called "community of interest." This section of the amendment would have
added a paragraph that makes union membership a primary factor in assessing whether a
potential unit shares a "community of interests." Accordingly, the amendment would have given
unions that do not want to represent certain non-members a right to submit a petition to the
commission for "clarification of the appropriate bargaining unit." This petition .for clarification
becomes crucial in the next section of the amendment.
Section 4 of the amendment would have amended section 5 of chapter 150E, which
governs the duties surrounding exclusive representation (any reference to a "union" in this
explanation assumes that the union is the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit). The
pre-amendment language of section 5 gives unions the right to negotiate agreements and
participate in grievance/arbitration proceedings for all employees in a bargaining unit. This
section of the amendment would have allowed unions to essentially discriminate against certain
non-member employees provided the union has petitioned for such non-members to be
excluded from the bargaining unit. Therefore, unions that do not wish to represent certain nonmembers would be able to file a petition as described in the preceding section of the
amendment, and remove those non-members from the bargaining unit. The union then would
have no duty to represent the interests of such non-members.
Moreover, the amendment would have allowed unions to charge non-members for the
costs of advancing grievances, including attorney's fees, arbitrator's fees, and hearing officer's
fees. The union would be allowed to force the non-member to pre-pay for such costs in
anticipation of arbitration, and failure to pay would relieve the union of any further
involvement in the matter. However, this section of the amendment would also have given
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unions the right to stay out of any grievance/arbitration proceedings of a non-member. In that
case, the non-member would be responsible for all fees and timely filings required by the
proceedings. Crucially, however, it would be entirely up to the union whether or not to
represent (and subsequently charge) the non-member regardless of the non-member's wishes.
Lastly, the amendment explained that a union's duty of fair representation would be
limited to negotiation and enforcement of contractual agreements with the public employer.
Accordingly, "[niothing in the laws of the Commonwealth shall be construed to require an
employee organization to provide its members any legal, economic or job-related services or
benefits outside of the collective bargainingagreement" (emphasis added).
Section 5 would have amended section 8 of chapter 150E, which governs grievance
procedures and arbitration. The pre-amendment language allows binding arbitration to be the
exclusive procedure for grievance proceedings if so designated by either party or as part of the
collective bargaining agreement. This section would have added a new paragraph to section 8 of
chapter 150E, and would have reinforced the previous section by once again explaining that a
union acting as an exclusive representative is under no obligation to represent a non-member in
grievance proceedings at any level of the administrative process. If the union did wish to
represent the non-member, the non-member could be charged fees for the service.
Section 6 of the amendment would have amended section 10(a)(3) of chapter 150E.
Section 10 generally deals with prohibited practices by employers and unions; 10(a)(3) forbids
an employer from discriminating "in regard to hiring, tenure, or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization." The
amendment would have added, directly after "organization," a clause that allows collective
bargaining agreements to provide different terms for members and non-members. It also would
have allowed an employer to deduct arbitrator's fees, not attributable to the employer, from the
wages of the non-member.
Section 7 of the amendment would have amended section 10(a)(6) of chapter 150E,
which forbids an employer from refusing to participate in good faith in collective bargaining
negotiation or arbitration procedures. The amendment would have added a clause stating that
neither public employers nor unions acting as exclusive representatives are under any obligation
to extend any benefits present in a collective bargaining agreement to a non-member. In
essence, once the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are set, the union would have
discretion as to what benefits, such as wage increases, are to be extended to non-members.
Section 8 of the amendment would have amended section 10(b)(1) of chapter 150E,
which forbids unions from interfering with an employee or employer in exercising rights granted
in chapter 150E. The amendment would have added language stating that it is not a prohibited
practice for a union (recognized as exclusive representative of a bargaining unit) to refuse to
participate in grievance procedures on behalf of any non-members. The amendment again
would have given the union the option to represent the non-member and charge him/her for
services.
Section 9 of the amendment would have amended section 10(b)(3) of chapter 150E,
which forbids a union from refusing to participate in good faith in collective bargaining or
arbitration proceedings. The amendment would have added language stating that collective
bargaining agreements may provide different terms of employment for members and nonmembers. The union again may choose not to participate in grievance proceedings on behalf of
non-members, but may also choose to do so and charge the non-member.
Section 10 would have amended section 12 of chapter 150E, which governs the
payment of agency fees. The amendment would have made void all of section 12 (as required
following Janus) and would have established a union's right to negotiate on behalf of all
members of a bargaining unit regardless of membership status. The amendment then repeated
the language that would give unions the option to represent non-members in grievance
proceedings, while giving unions the right to participate at every level of such proceedings if
they so choose. The amendment would have encouraged unions and employers to revisit their
current agreements and make them consistent with the provisions of this section. This section
also would have provided for a "presumption of good faith" in any collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 11 of the amendment would have amended section 17A of chapter 180. The
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pre-amendment language of 17A governs payroll deductions for union dues. The amendment
would have striken all of 17A and replaced it with new provisions. It would have still allowed for
payroll deductions for union dues, but would have added that authorization for payroll
deduction is irrevocable pursuant to the terms of such authorization for one year from the date
of the authorization
Section 12 of the amendment would have amended section 26 of chapter 161A, which
deals with the applicability of section 5 of chapter 150A. Chapter 161A generally governs
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. Section 5 of chapter 150A governs exclusive
representation and outlines the associated rights and responsibilities. The amendment would
have added language that makes section 5 applicable to a union that bargains with the MBTA.
The MBTA is now required to provide "access" to members of the bargaining unit that the
union exclusively represents. Access includes the following: (1) the right to meet with
employees on the premises of the public employer to discuss and investigate grievances and
other workplace issues; (2) the right to conduct meetings on site during lunch or other breaks
that deal with any matter related to the duties of exclusive representation (collective bargaining
negotiation, workplace issues, internal union matters); and (3) the right to meet with newly
hired employees for a minimum of 30 minutes within 10 days from the date of hire or during
employee orientations.
The amendment would also have given non-members the right to present or arbitrate
grievances with the MBTA at their own expense, provided the Representative Employee
Organization (REO) is given notice and an opportunity to attend and represent its members.
The REO would not have to represent non-members.
Section 13 of the amendment would have amended section 10B of chapter 66, which
governs the divulgence of the personal information of employees. The amendment would have
added language stating that the home address, personal email address, and home or mobile
telephone of the following class of employees cannot be made public record: agency, executive
office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth,
political subdivision or authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose. This
information could, however, be supplied to "an employee organization whose written aims and
objective on file with the department of labor relations are to represent public employees in
collective bargaining."
Section 14 of the amendment, notwithstanding any collective bargaining agreement to
the contrary, would have allowed various health and welfare trust funds (NAGE, SEIU Local
5000) to reimburse non-members a sum equal to that sent to the Trust Funds by the employer.
This would have only happened after a 50 percent vote by the trustees, and once reimbursed a
non-member is no longer eligible for any programs offered by the various trusts.
Section 15 added a clause stating that if any of the above conditions is found
unconstitutional, then the provisions will be rendered void.
Amendment 66 ("Boncore Amendment"), S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018) (on
file with author), was similar. Amendment 66 would have amended chapter 150E by adding
section 5A. Section 5A would have first ensured that public employers must provide to a union
access to members of the bargaining unit. "Access" here was defined using the exact same
language as in section 12 of Amendment 316, but in this case it would have applied to all public
employees, not just those employed by the MBTA. This amendment also provided that the
union has the right to use the email system of a public employer to communicate with members
of the bargaining unit regarding "union-related matters," provided this access does not become
too burdensome for the employer. Further, the amendment would have allowed unions to use
government buildings and facilities to conduct meetings related to collective bargaining
agreements, grievance investigation, "and internal union matters involving governance or
business of the union." The union using this space may be charged for maintenance and security
costs.
Amendment 66 also would have amended section 5 of chapter 150E by adding
language that once again would have given unions discretion over their involvement in
grievance procedures for non-members. Moreover, it stated, "[n]othing in the laws of the
Commonwealth shall be construed to prohibit an employee organization from providing only to
its members any legal, economic, or job-related services or benefits outside of the collective
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adopted, public unions will no longer be obligated to represent fairly
all employees in the workplace, although their enhanced access to
employees' home addresses, emails and other contact information
should allow them ample opportunity to make the case for dues
paying membership."
Further, and as if to signal the legislators' own doubts about the
legality of these changes, the amendments provided that in
proceeding in the newly authorized manner by distinguishing between
members and non-members when bargaining, there shall be a
"presumption" that the union has acted in good faith.12
This essay focuses on this hurried, even panicked response to
Janus in Massachusetts and evaluates the likely outcome that
encouraging a public union to treat member employees in one way
and non-member employees in a distinctly less generous way will
have for employees and the unions. I begin, in Part II, by noting (and
explaining) the first and most apparent oddity in this story: why is an
employer - i.e. the state - rushing to help its putative, arms-length

bargaining partners? In Massachusetts, there are many different
public-sector unions. School teachers, 3 firefighters,1 4 clerical
bargaining agreement" (emphasis added).
Amendment 66 would have amended section 26 of chapter 161A by introducing
language that would have give any labor organization representing employees the right to
negotiate agreements covering all employees in that unit. Interestingly, the amended language
also would have stated that such a labor organization "shall be responsible for representing the
interests of all such employees without discrimination and without regard to employee
organization membership." This duty of fair representation regardless of membership status is
notably absent from Amendment 316 in dealing with chapter 150E. The union could have
required non-members to pay for the costs of advancing a grievance. Amendment 66 further
stated that the duty of fair representation was limited to negotiating and enforcing the terms of
agreement with public employers, and unions may choose to provide benefits outside the scope
of collective bargaining to members without providing such benefits to non-members. This last
part was identical with the provision outlined in section 4 of Amendment 316.
11. Proposed amendment 66, S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018) (to be codified at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 5A) ("Within 10 calendar days from the date a prospective school
employee accepts an offer of employment or the date of hire of all other public bargaining unit
employees, public employers shall provide the following contact information to an exclusive
representative employee organization in an spreadsheet Excel file format or other format
agreed to by the exclusive representative employee organization: name, job, title, worksite
location, home address, work telephone numbers, any home and personal cellular telephone
numbers on file with the public employer, date of hire, work email address, and any personal
email address on file with the public employer.").
12. Proposed amendment 316, S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018) (to be codified at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 12) ("There is hereby established the presumption that the
employee organization recognized as the exclusive representative has conducted all of its
negotiations in good faith based upon the employee organization'sunderstandingof what is best
for the bargainingunit as a whole.") (emphasis added). This proposal essentially would grant
public-sector unions full discretion in their ability to discriminate against non-members.
13. E.g., Bos. TEACHERS UNION (BTU), <https://btu.org/> (last visited Sept. 16, 2018)
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workers," state and local police,16 and many others" are all
represented. What would motivate the state to want to protect union
finances which might be jeopardized by the Janus decision?
Part III examines the specific proposals and concludes that either
state or federal constitutional claims may prevent implementation of
the legislative proposals. I also note that these proposals cry out for
easy comparison to the legislative reactions of numerous southern
state legislatures following the Court's decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education" and subsequent civil rights decisions and reek of a
worrying kind of resistance to the Court's authority at the local level.' 9
Finally, in Part IV I suggest that, if implemented, Janus holds
great promise for re-setting the relationship between public-sector
unions and state legislators that has become very worrying and
tremendously expensive for taxpayers. When Abood was decided in

("The Boston Teachers Union proudly represents more than 10,000 teachers, paraprofessionals
& retirees.").
14.

E.g., Our Mission, PROF'L FIRE FIGHTERS OF MASS. (PFFM), <http://www.pffm.org/

?zonc=/unionactive/view article.cfm&HomelD=229343&page=About20Us> (last visited Sept.
16, 2018) ("The objective of this organization shall be to organize all paid professional fire
fighters within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to encourage the formation of local unions
affiliated with the International Association of Fire Fighters, and this organization.").
15.

E.g., Our History and Principles, HARVARD UNION OF CLERICAL & TECH. WORKERS

(HUCTW), <https://huctw.org/about-us/our-history> (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) ("We address
larger issues through policy work (both in and outside of contract negotiations) and smaller
issues via behind-the-scenes coaching and/or direct advocacy. Our grievance procedure consists
of local, hands-on problem solving, aimed at practical outcomes that equitably empower and
support employees while still serving the larger mission of Harvard.").
16. E.g., About the Massachusetts Police Association (MPA), MASS. POLICE Ass'N (MPA),
<http://www.masspolice.com/about/> (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) ("The MPA supports police in
Massachusetts. We always have and we always will. From Western Mass to the Cape, the North
Shore to Boston proper and everywhere in between, our organization offers assistance,
guidance, services, and information to all the members of our various police forces and their
supporters. We work hard to shine a positive light on the honored members of law enforcement
in the Commonwealth through action, involvement, and informative publications within the
state's cities and towns.").
17. See infra note 23.
18. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (holding that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of
separate but equal has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal")
(internal quotes omitted).
19. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (banning laws prohibiting interracial
marriage); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(holding that associational freedom allows the NAACP to withhold membership lists for fear of
racial targeting). Perhaps the most significant challenge to the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown
came when the Arkansas state legislature challenged the notion that they were bound by the
Court's decision, and amended their state constitution to combat desegregation. This resistance
came to a head in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), in which a per curiam decision held that
states are bound by Supreme Court decisions even if state law contradicts such decisions. Any
state law attempts to nullify federal law are ineffective.
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1977 almost no one20 anticipated the growth of public-sector unions
and their outsize influence on state and local politics. Public unions,
like their private sector counterparts, play an important role in the
regulation of a large part of the American workplace. The corrosive
dynamic that has developed between the unions and the
legislators/employers has, however, contributed significantly to the
bankruptcy of more than one American municipality in recent years,2
22
and threatens the financial health of more than a few states.
20. Indeed, some of this country's most distinguished leaders warned against public
unions, most notably liberal champion Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In a letter written to Luther
C. Steward, President of the National Federation of Federal Employees, Roosevelt advised,
"All Government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually
understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has distinct and insurmountable
limitations when applied to public personnel management." Letter from President Franklin
Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President of the Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937),
available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15445>.
21. Central Falls, Rhode Island serves as a prime example of municipal bankruptcy due to
union-influenced public spending. See Mary Williams Walsh & Abby Goodnough, Edging
Toward Default: A Small City's Depleted Pension Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2011, at B1. Public unions in Central Falls used their bargaining influence to secure huge
retirement benefits for firefighters and police officers. When it realized its pension fund would
run out of money long before these benefit packages could be delivered, city officials tried to
renegotiate terms with local public unions. When this was unsuccessful, Central Falls was forced
to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy to relieve itself of unfunded pension liabilities. Id. at B1, B7. A
similar story unfolded in Vallejo, California, where spending on public safety employees alone
amounted to three-fourths of general city funds. The city filed for Chapter 9 on May 6, 2008. See
Adam Tanner, San Francisco Suburb Vallejo Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (May 23, 2008,
11:33 PM), <https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-bankruptcy-california-city/san-francisco-suburbvallejo-files-for-bankruptcy-idUSN2352179020080524>. When in 2012 unfunded pension costs
reached $147.5 million in Stockton, California, that city, too resorted to Chapter 9. See Jim
Christie, Stockton, CA Filesfor Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 28, 2012, 10:46 PM), <https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-stockton-bankruptcy/stockton-california-files-for-bankruptcy-idUSBRE8
5S05120120629>. The single largest instance of municipal bankruptcy (in terms of city
population and total debt), however, came in 2013 when Detroit, Michigan filed for Chapter 9.
See Associated Press, Reports Made by Emergency Manager Says Detroit's Finances are
Crumbling, Future is Bleak, Fox NEWS (May 13, 2013), <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/201
3/05/13/report-by-emergency-manager-says-detroit-finances-are-crumbling-and-future-is.html>.
Notably, public unions in Detroit refused to help alleviate the situation by seeing any decrease
in their pension obligations, which constituted a major portion of the city's debt. See Id. ("It's
highly unlikely [Detroit] will seek concessions from the city's labor unions. At least five unions
representing police and firefighters are seeking arbitration in collective bargaining with the
city.").
22. Illinois in particular faces a daunting financial outlook. See Kristen Barnes, The Public
Pension Crisis Through the Lens of State Constitutions and Statutory Law, 92 CHI. -KENT L.
REV. 393, 403 (2017) ("Much can be learned from Illinois and its largest municipality, Chicago,
regarding the connections'between state and local governance, constitutional protection of
pension rights, and tenable strategies to avoid fiscal crisis. With unfunded pension deficits of
approximately $111 billion, Illinois is experiencing fiscal distress of historic proportions.")
(citations omitted); Maria Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard:The Casefor RationalizingPublic
Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 446 (2012) ("The pension situation in Illinois is by far
the most absurd in the nation. Illinois appears on the bottom rung on every analysis of state
debt. The present funded ratio is a mere 51%, creating a $62 billion shortfall, even when using
highly optimistic official discount rates. The situation is so dire that some economists have
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II. WHY DON'T LEGISLATURES BEHAVE LIKE PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYERS?

Perhaps the most striking feature of the post-Janus story in
Massachusetts is that it is the legislature that has rushed to help the
unions - not their own members or private sector unions. Given that
many unions represent individuals who work directly for the state,23
this presents a puzzle. Why does the employer/legislature want to
provide material help to the entity it regularly bargains with?
Wouldn't a less powerful party on the other side of the table present a
welcome opportunity to obtain concessions with respect to wages,
salaries, benefits, and other conditions of employment? What does it
mean that, within days of the announcement of the Janus decision,
the legislature was ready and eager to step in and assist its
counterparty? It is hard to think of a comparable, private sector
response, and that is because the relationship between public-sector
unions and the employers they "negotiate" with is typically not a
function of arms-length negotiation, but is rather a distorted, collusive
relationship that primarily disadvantages the taxpayer by raising
costs.

estimated that Illinois will run out of money to fund its pensions within seven years."); Amy
Monahan, When a Promise is Not a Promise: Chicago-Style Pensions, 64 U.C.L.A L. REV. 356,
358 (2017) ("While unfunded pension liability is a nationwide issue, it is becoming an acute crisis
in a handful of cities and states. In 2013, each household in the city of Chicago would have
needed to contribute between $28,472 and $66,900 in order to fully fund the city's pension plans.
The city of Chicago's teacher pension plan 'stands at risk of collapse.' Mayor Rahm Emanuel
recently stated that Chicago's pension debt 'is a big dark cloud that hangs over the rest of our
city's finances."') (citations omitted); Richard F. Dye, Balancing Illinois' Budget Will Be
Painful, Guaranteed, STATE J.-REG. (Mar. 25, 2014, 1:07 AM), <http://www.sj-r.com/article/
20140325/opinion/140329814> ("Each year of delay in eliminating the deficit makes the future
situation even worse. Just like a family that spends more than its income in a given year, if the
state runs a deficit it must either pay with funds saved in prior years or take on new debt. Once
spent, previously accumulated assets and the interest it would have earned are unavailable in
the future."). While Illinois may serve as the poster child for public debt crises, a number of
states are in similarly dire financial straits. See Joshua D. Rauh, Why City Pension Problems
Have Not Improved, and a Roadmap Forward, (Hoover Inst., Working Paper No. 15101, 2015).
Rauh uses data from New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago,
Jacksonville, Boston, San Francisco, and Atlanta to conclude that despite stock increases in
each of the ten major cities, unfunded pension liabilities have continued to rise in recent years.
Id. at 19. From 2009 to 2013, total pension liabilities in these cities grew from $281 billion to
$357 billion, which constitutes a 27 percent increase over the five-year period. Id. at 6.
23. For example, the State Police Organization of Massachusetts, NAGE SEIU, SEIU
Local 888, Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union, and Boston Firefighters Local
718 all represent state employees.
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A. The Normal Presumptionsof Bargaining
Although it is not stated expressly very often, the key problem
with "bargaining" in the public sector is that the two parties - the
public union and the legislature/employer - operate subject to
radically different incentives than the employer and union in the
private context. In the private realm, the union is well aware that it
must avoid pushing for too much or it risks driving the employer out
of business. The well documented "give backs" in the auto industry in
the 1990s, where the United Automobile Workers (UAW) agreed to
contracts with two tier wage rates and to absorb a share of increased
health care costs, are a good example of this.24 Once it became clear to
both parties that foreign competition was cutting into the profits of
American auto makers in a profound way,25 the UAW recognized that
some concessions on its part were essential to its own survival.26 The
24. When, for example, Chrysler was facing bankruptcy in the late 1970's, the UAW
accepted wage and benefit reductions and lobbied the government for a bailout solution in
order to keep the company afloat. See Judith Miller, A Compromise Plan on Aid to Chrysler,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 1979), <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1979/12/21/117
59114.html?zoom=14&pageNumber=1>. ("[The compromise bill] provides Chrysler with the
$1.5 billion in guarantees on the condition that the company's unionized workers contribute
$462.5 million in wage and benefit concessions and that management and nonunionized
employees contribute $125 million in salary cuts or holds on salaries. This provision will
probably require the United Automobile Workers to renegotiate its recently ratified threeyear
contract with the company."). In 1982, the UAW approved a new contract with Ford that would
save the company over $1 billion. See John Holusha, Ford Workers Accept Concessions in New
Contract By Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1982), <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/01/us/
ford-workers-accept-concessions-in-new-contract-by-wide-margin.html>. In return for cut backs
in wages in benefits, UAW workers received shared profits, as well as guarantees in job security
that resulted from Ford not having to close down any plants. Id. With an increasing popularity
of foreign cars in the mid 1980's, the UAW again negotiated contracts with both Ford and G.M.
that would alleviate some of this pressure, which in turn promoted job security for auto-industry
workers. See John Holusha, Auto Union Gains a Pact with Ford; G.M. Accord is Set, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 1984), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/08fbusiness/uaw-auto-union-time
line.html?mtrref=www.google.com#/#time386_11137> ("Ford officials said their contract would
not be excessively costly and said it would give the company the flexibility in operations it needs
to meet foreign competition."). UAW continued this cooperation in the 2000's, when it agreed
to a $1 billion cut in healthcare health care benefits for over 750,000 workers, saving G.M. $15
billion in future retiree healthcare liability. Danny Hakim, G.M. and Union in a Deal to Cut
Health Care Benefits, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 18, 2005), <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/18/busi
ness/gm-and-union-in-a-deal-to-cut-health-benefits.html>.
One major component of these concessions was the implementation of a two-tier wage
system, in which "first-tier" employees are able to earn upwards of $28/hour, while "secondtier" employees earn something in the range of $16-19/hour. Bernie Woodall, For UAW
Members, Two-Tier Wage Issue is Personal, REUTERS (June 2, 2015, 1:23 AM), <https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-autos-usa-families-idUSKBNOIOOC420150602>. Auto-makers in Detroit
have praised the system, saying it saved them from imminent death during the 2008 recession
and has helped preserved thousands of jobs. Id.
25. See John Holusha, The Americanizing of Japan's Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1982),
<https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/14/business/the-americanizing-of-japan-s-cars.html>.
26. See Bruce Harreld, Chrysler Fiat2009 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Case 811-030, 2010); see also
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incentive for the private employer is generally to give as little as
possible since its bottom line is directly affected by any increase in
labor costs. The incentive for the private union is to seek as much as
possible, but not so much that it puts the very existence of the
employer in jeopardy.
In the public context this dynamic - well understood by both
parties - is distorted by several factors. First, the party whose dollars
are on the line is not actually at the table. The taxpayer, who will foot
the bill for any increase in wages or benefits is represented at the
table, in theory, by her elected representative. As with so many things
in life, this is a relationship complicated by agency theory in its
simplest form. The elected official typically wants nothing more than
to be reelected. To do this she needs plenty of cash, endorsements
and often foot soldiers who will take on mundane tasks like
leafletting and going door to door to drum up support during a
campaign.27 She also needs to avoid angering or offending voters.
B. The Public Sector Is Different
Voters, legislators quickly learn, often fail to pay attention to the
details of government: how much services cost, how services will be
provided and by whom, and whether there exist less expensive and
more efficient ways of providing those services. Voters typically trust
their elected officials to make prudent choices with their tax dollars, a
level of trust that is sometimes misplaced as the recent spate of
municipal bankruptcies has revealed. Given the level of detail and
complication of so many modern-day government functions, it is not
surprising that voters either do not or cannot exercise much oversight
over day-to-day decisions about spending. From time to time a
scandal will erupt to be sure. 8
Micheline Maynard, With U.A.W. Accord, G.M. Looks to a New Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 27,
2007), h<ttps://www.nytimes.comi/2007/09/27/business/27auto.html> (explaining how the UAW
accepted cutbacks in benefits to allow G.M. to compete with foreign companies such as Toyota
and Honda); Micheline Maynard, Workers at Chrysler Approve Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28,
(detailing how UAW
2007), <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/business/28auto.html>
concessions in the contract negotiation will give Chrysler long-term security).
27. For a detailed analysis of voters' attitudes towards incumbents at the local level, see
Christopher R. Berry & William G. Howell, Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking
Retrospective Voting, 69 J. POL. 844 (2007).
28. Recent developments in Methuen, Massachusetts provide a particularly shocking
example. A new contract negotiated between the Methuen city council and the local police
union resulted in wage increases for police officers that will cost the city, and the taxpayers, $3
million in the first fiscal year. One officer who stands to see a significant pay raise is the son of
Mayor James P. Jajuga, who has pleaded ignorance as to how the intricacies of the contract will
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In general, though, elected officials know that they operate with
a high degree of freedom from scrutiny by the people whose money
they are spending. Public-sector unions know this as well, and it is the
intersection of this knowledge by both parties that explains the odd
dynamic found in public-sector "bargaining."
Thus, at the public-sector bargaining table, the union can offer
the politician something she needs and wants - resources to help her
get and stay in office - and the politician can offer what the union
always wants - increases in compensation (especially deferred
compensation for reasons I explain below) and ever more flexible
rules governing workplace behavior such as comp time,29 paid time
off," sick leave,3 1 and the cashing out of vacation days. 3 2 Union

officials, just like professional politicians, increase the likelihood of
retaining union officer status by demonstrating to the membership
the generous results they obtained via aggressive and savvy
negotiations. The elected official, in return, enjoys political
contributions, endorsements, and other forms of direct support. It is a
win-win for everyone but the taxpayer.
Examples of this dynamic abound in states with strong publicsector unions.33 Someone will assert though that the salaries of publicresult in outrageous and unsustainable wage increases for police officers. Extensive benefit
promises, a theme among union-negotiated contracts, are the driving force behind the high cost
of these contracts. These raises also come on the heels of a $6.5 million budget shortfall, which
resulted in the layoff of fifty-two teachers and nine school administrators. See Michael
Levenson, $432,000 Salaries Outrage Officials, Bos. GLOBE, June 26, 2018, at A-1.
29. The Methuen contract gives salary bonuses for wearing body cameras and earning a
college degree. See id.
30. The current contract between the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State
Police Association of Massachusetts, for example has resulted in bi-weekly, instead of monthly,
accrual of benefits for vacation time and sick leave. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETES
AND STATE POLICE ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS AGREEMENT (2017), <https://www.
mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/19/Unit-5A-State-Police-SPAM-contractO.pdf>.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 16.
33. In Illinois, economists have generally identified several factors contributing to the
public debt crisis, including the state's habitual over-promising of benefits to public employees,
generous cost of living adjustments, and the tendency of public-sector retirees to "double-dip"
into multiple pensions via loopholes in collective bargaining agreements. Debra Burns, Note,
Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay: States, Their Public Pension Bills, and the Constitution, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L.O. 253, 267 (2012). Estimates put Illinois' unfunded pension liability at
$251 billion, which is more than the combined market value of Boeing, Caterpillar, United
Continental, and Allstate. In an effort to remedy years of financial mismanagement, Illinois has
hiked up property taxes so much that people are simply leaving the state. Similar public debt
issues have forced Chapter 9 bankruptcy in several U.S. cities. One notable example is Central
Falls, Rhode Island, which accumulated massive debt from unfunded benefit liabilities. The city
faced $80 million in unfunded pensions and retiree health benefits, which in turn quadrupled the
city's annual budget of $17 million. This was accompanied by sharp increases in property tax
and a gutting of the city's workforce. See Richard Simon, Rhode Island's Central Falls Reeling
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sector workers are below those in the private sector. This is a
complicated argument to evaluate as so many public-sector functions
are not duplicated in the private sector - e.g., police and fire, and civil
servant jobs in areas where the state enjoys a monopoly such as the
motor vehicles department.
Let's assume though, for the moment, that salaries are not overly
generous in the public sector. As all first-year students of human
resources know, however, compensation is a function of both wages
or salaries and benefits. A dramatic increase in wages requires a fairly
rapid increase in taxes to be paid more or less concurrently. The
explosive growth in public-sector employee benefit costs, especially
those associated with benefits available in retirement, offer the
parties a way to increase compensation without a shocking, nearly
immediate increase in taxes.
This may explain why salaries (at least in some cases) in the
private and public sectors are not very divergent,34 but postFrom Underfunded Pensions, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013), <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug
/03/nation/la-na-adv-central-falls-20130804>. Lastly, San Bernardino, California provides
another illustration of the potential pitfalls of strong union clout at the bargaining table. Years
of excessive benefit promises for public employces culminated in a $46 million deficit, which
forced the city of over 200,000 residents to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Although Chapter 9
will allow San Bernardino to renegotiate employment contracts, pension liabilities will not be
cut. Immediately following the vote for bankruptcy, unions began putting the pressure on the
city to ensure the safety of the very unfunded pensions that forced this undesirable solution. See
Phil Willon, San Bernardino Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2012), <http://
The similarity of
articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/10/local/la-me-0711-san-bernardino-20120711>.
the issues faced by the smallest town in the smallest state, a Midwestern state boasting one of
the most populous cities in the country, and a mid-sized city on the west coast points to a
common denominator of over-influential public-sector unions, and government officials that are
far too quick to acquiesce their demands.
34. There is considerable evidence that, at least in some cases, salaries in states with strong
public-sector unions are also abnormally high. For example, nationally, the average salary for
prison guards is about $45,000. California's guards average a salary that is approximately 60
percent above the national average and, once overtime is taken into account, California prison
guards often make more than $100,000 per year. In addition to salary distortions, California
prison guards who belong to the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA)
(their public-sector bargaining representative) engage in political activity that is clearly designed
to increase rates of incarceration and therefore demand for the work they do. See, e.g.,
Alexander Volokh, Privatizationand the Law and Economics of PoliticalAdvocacy, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1197, 1221-25 (2008). Lt. Kevin Peters, a CCPOA member noted:
You can get a job anywhere. This is a career. And with the upward mobility and
rapid expansion of the department, there are opportunities for the people who are
[already] correction staff, and opportunities for the general public to become
correctional officers. We've gone from 12 institutions to 28 in 12 years, and with
"Three Strikes" and the overcrowding we're going to experience with that,- we're
going to need to build at least three prisons a year for the next five years. Each
one of those institutions will take approximately 1000 employees.
Tim Kowal, The Role of the Prison Guards Union in California'sTroubled Prison System, CAL.
POL'Y CTR. (June 5, 2011), <https://californiapolicycenter.org/the-role-of-the-prison-guardsunion-in-californias-troubled-prison-system/>.
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employment benefits often are. The literature about overly generous
public-sector retirement and retiree health care benefits documents
well the number of municipalities and states that have encountered
severe financial problems as a result of profligate spending."
I will not repeat the litany here except to note the common
characteristics: very early retirement options (sometimes after only
twenty years of service when an employee is still in his forties),36
retiree health care without co-pays or other forms of cost sharing to
control expenses, 31 pension stacking,38 and other practices that are
35. See, e.g., JOSHUA RAUH, HOOVER INST., HIDDEN DEBT, HIDDEN DEFICITS: How
PENSION PROMISES ARE CONSUMING STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS 2 (2017), <https://www.ho
over.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/rauh-hiddendebt20l7_finalwebreadypdfl.pdf>
("What is in fact going on is that the governments are borrowing from workers and promising to
repay that debt when they retire, but the accounting standards allow the bulk of this debt to go
unreported through the assumption of high rates of return."); Jack Becrmann, The Public
Pension Crisis, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2013) ("While most public employers and
employees in the United States set aside money each year to fund future projected pension
obligations, many public pension plans are seriously underfunded either intentionally or due to
unrealistic assumptions concerning investment performance and the amount that will be owed
over time. This means that unless contributions are increased substantially, future pension
payments to retired government works will be made, at least in part, from current revenues. The
problem is thought to be so serious that some local governments may be effectively insolvent.");
Hylton, supra note 22, at 446 ("The astonishing debt figures that GASB 45 finally forced states
to report are the logical result of years of rent seeking by legislators and public-sector unions.
Well organized unions push hard for improved benefits. Politicians, who are legally obligated to
negotiate with these unions on behalf of the taxpayers, understand that strong union support in
the form of votes and dollars can be secured by increasing compensation to the union's
membership."); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Revenue Demands of Public Employee
Pension Promises, 6 AM. ECON. JOURNAL: ECON. POLICY 193, 193 (2014) ("Without policy
changes, contributions would have to increase by 2.5 times [to achieve full funding of state and
local pension systems in the United States over thirty years], reaching 14.1 percent of the total
own revenue generated by state and local governments. This represents a tax increase of $1,385
per household per year, about half of which would go to pay down legacy liabilities while half
would fund the cost of new promises."); Rhiannon Jerch et al., Efficient Local Government
Service Provision: The Role of Privatizationand Public Sector Unions 27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 22088, 2016) ("Strong union bargaining
power in non-right-to-work states appears to increase the number of full time employees on pay
roll, holding the service area constant. These effects are most pronounced for a city's largest
transit agency, which suggests public-sector unions shift their bargaining pressure toward the
dominant transit agencies such as Chicago's CTA, New York's MTA, or Boston's MBTA.");
Amy Monahan, Who's Afraid of Good Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension
Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Working Paper No. 12-23, 2012) ("If neither plan participants nor state taxpayers are able to
effectively monitor and challenge a state's inadequate funding or improper investment
decisions, public plans are very likely to remain underfunded.").
36. See Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of Employee
Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 93 (2010).
37. Id. at 92
38. Michael Levenson, $432,000 Salaries Outrage Officials: Methuen Contract Changes Pay
Scale for Police Officers, BOS. GLOBE, June 26, 2018, at A-1. Because of a complex system of
calculating wages in the Methuen police contracts, salaries "stack" from rank to rank such that
the highest ranking officers end up earning a ridiculous amount. This happens because the
generous benefits in the contract become part of the base salary when calculating the pay
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rare or unknown in the private sector.3 9
The public-sector union, although it may resemble a union in the
private sector, is really quite a different and problematic creature: it
bargains with a party that, at best, needs to consider only future costs
that are often so far down the road that the elected official can well
afford to leave the question of how to pay for the promises to the next
generation. The public-sector union can offer political help (or
opposition) that matters intensely because its bargaining partner is a
politician and not a profit maximizing business. I cannot help but
think that the peculiar features of public unions informed the
decidedly anti-government union views of the architect of the New
Deal, FDR. He wrote:
The process of collective bargaining.. . cannot be transplanted into
public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations
when applied to public personnel management.... The very nature
and purposes of government make it impossible for administrative
officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual
discussions with Government employee organizations.4 0
Indeed.
III. How Do MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATORS HOPE TO HELP
PUBLIC UNIONS AFTER JANUS?
Although commentators anticipated coordinated responses to
Janus, several proposed amendments to labor laws in Massachusetts
reflect an especially intense reaction. The proposals did not attempt
to mask their true purpose through subtle language, instead overtly
including provisions designed to discriminate against public
employees that do not belong to a union. For example, the current
provisions prohibit unions and employers from discriminating with
regard to terms of employment in order to encourage union
affiliation.4 ' Section 6 of the new proposal, however, added an
exception that would allow collective bargaining agreements to
"provide different terms and conditions of employment for members
of the employee organization (i.e. the union) than those terms and
conditions applied by the public employer to employees who have

increase, as well as the fact that each rank must earn a certain percentage more than the rank
below. So when even a low-rank officer is getting a considerable increase due to the inclusion of
benefits in the calculation, the higher-ranking officers receive immense raises.
39. Edwards, supra note 36, at 92.
40. Letter, supra note 20.
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, §10(a)(3) (2017).
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elected not to maintain membership in the employee organization."4 2
There is no need to read between the lines here; this proposal would
allow unions to negotiate better deals for members of the union than
for non-members.
To reinforce this new latitude in negotiations, a proposed
provision of the amendments flatly stated that there is an established
presumption that all negotiation between the union acting as
exclusive representative for a bargaining unit and the employer has
been done in good faith.43 This presumption of good faith is clearly
meant to complement a union's ability to provide less favorable terms
for non-members, as blatant discrimination based on membership
status feels very much like bad faith. It is also crucial to note that
where this presumption of good faith would attach, the following
language would be deleted entirely: "It shall be a prohibited labor
practice for an employee organization or its affiliates to discriminate
against an employee on the basis of the employee's membership, nonmembership or agency fee status in the employee organization or its
affiliates.""
Additionally, the amendments proposed giving unions the option
to process grievances and engage in arbitration on behalf of nonmembers. If a union chooses to do so, it may deduct costs from the
non-members' wages; if it chooses not to, the non-member is required
to handle the entire grievance process on his own.45 What is notable
about this provision is that the decision is entirely in the hands of the
union. Even if the employee does not wish to be represented in
grievance proceedings by the union, the union may nevertheless do so
and subsequently charge the non-member for expenses.
Were these proposals to be enacted into law, public-sector
unions in Massachusetts would have complete discretion in
disadvantaging non-members in contract negotiation. The proposals
illustrate the common conviction that "free riders" cannot be
tolerated in public unions and would remedy that perceived problem
in two possible ways: (1) lower salaries or benefits of non-members so
as to make up the cost of losing agency fees or to impose some notion
of fairness; or (2) force the hands of non-members who cannot afford
to see disadvantaged contracts into joining the union.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. § 6.
Amendment 316, §12, S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, §12
Amendment 316, §5, S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018).

2018]

MASSACHUSETTS LABOR LAW AFTER JANUS

317

IV. THIS RESISTANCE IS UNATTRACTIVE

The Massachusetts Legislature's speedy response to Janus is
telling, as it reveals the depths of the close relationship and codependency that has developed between elected representatives and
the unions representing state and local employees. The proposed
changes to chapter 150E, if enacted, would permit, indeed almost
invite, public unions to punish non-members by negotiating terms of
employment that discriminate on the basis of union membership.
Members would presumably enjoy better salaries, more generous
vacation and disability arrangements, and, of course, dental and
vision insurance.4
How this would affect non-members is hard to know at this
point. Presumably, once informed about the new "costs" associated
with non-membership, some portion of employees who considered
taking advantage of their First Amendment rights 47 as described in
Janus would reconsider. To be sure, for a substantial number of
employees, these changes will make no difference as they continue to
pay dues and enjoy the benefits of membership. For the unions, the
hope is surely that estimates of post-Janus membership losses, some
as high as 20 percent," will turn out to be overstated. The pending

46. Amendment 316, §6, S.B. 2625, 190th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2018) (to be codified at MASS
GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 10(a)(3)); this provision gives public-sector unions the ability to
negotiate better contracts (which could include benefits such as dental and vision insurance) for
members of the union, while leaving out beneficial provisions for non-members.
47. The First Amendment concerns dealt with in Janus focused on the constitutionality of
the agency fee arrangement, in which public workers who were non-members of a union were
forced to pay the union for the costs of collective bargaining. A majority opinion written by
Justice Alito considered such payments a form of compelled speech, insofar as it amounts to
being forced to subsidize speech with which one might disagree. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State
Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018). As Justice Alito wrote, "Because
the compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it
cannot be casually allowed." Id. at 2464. Accordingly, the agency fee provision was subjected to
"exacting" scrutiny. To pass this level of scrutiny, the agency fee provision must serve a
"compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." Id. at 2465 (internal quotations omitted). The Court found neither the
justifications of labor peace nor avoiding free riders as sufficient to warrant the free speech
restrictions imposed by the agency fee arrangement. Alito wrote,
Whichever description fits the majority of public employees who would not
subsidize a union if given the option, avoiding free riders is not a compelling
interest . . . To hold otherwise across the board would have startling
consequences. Many private groups speak out with the objective of obtaining
government action that will have the effect of benefiting nonmembers. May all
those who are thought to benefit from such efforts be compelled to subsidize this
speech?
Id. at 2466. Accordingly, the Court ruled that agency fee arrangements are unconstitutional.
48. See Kate Walsh & Kency Nittler, Analysis: How Will a Janus Ruling Impact Teachers
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changes to chapter 150E should, if enacted and understood by
employees, help keep the losses to a minimum.
No matter what changes Massachusetts ultimately adopts, the
post-Janus world looks like an ugly place, especially for any public
employee unfortunate enough to dislike the political and/or economic
activity of the union that enjoys the right of exclusive representation
in her workplace. The intent of the legislature and its partner unions
is to make employees pay in concrete, financial terms, if they choose
to exercise the constitutional rights that the Supreme Court says
they've been wrongly denied since Abood was decided four decades
ago.
This kind of bald faced effort to force individuals to make costly
choices is reminiscent of the "massive resistance"49 promised by
southern state legislatures when confronted with Supreme Court
decisions that likewise, and in an unpopular context, insisted on the
basic constitutional rights of racial minorities." It is a measure of the
desperation of both the employer (Massachusetts elected officials)
and their "adversaries" (public-sector unions) that neither seems at
all interested in the possibility of legitimate dissent by employees. In
spite of the rhetoric about protecting workers and their families," the
and Unions in Each State? Dataand Interactive Maps Tell the Story, THE 74 (Mar. 19, 2018), <htt
ps://www.the7 4 million.org/article/analysis-how-will-a-janus-ruling-impact-teachers-and-unionsin-cach-state-data-interactive-maps-tell-the-story/>.
49. Coined by U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., "Massive Resistance" was a strategy
employed by Virginia's state government as a response to the ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which called for the desegregation of public schools.
Dually motivated by racial intolerance and a belief that the federal government cannot meddle
in local affairs, Byrd and the Massive Resistance movement were determined to block
desegregation, even closing schools if necessary. Byrd was also one of the 100 southern
politicians to sign the "Southern Manifesto," which southern elected officials saw as an official
condemnation of the Court's ruling in Brown. Massive Resistance also received a boost from
Virginia Governor Thomas B. Stanley, whose "Stanley Plan" consisted of closing schools facing
a desegregation order while blocking litigation from members of the NAACP. The Stanley Plan
blocked state funding of any school that was to be desegregated, and created a special board
that placed students in schools almost entirely based off race. Eventually, the movement came
into conflict with the federal court system, which found the school closings unconstitutional. The
movement also faced some local opposition, as Virginia officials believed it was doing harm to
the economy. Although legislative support for Massive Resistance officially ended around 1959,
it was not until 1968 that a Supreme Court ruling in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430
(1968), facilitated the opening of many schools that were closed as part of the movement. See
generally ENCYCLOPEDIA VIRGINIA (2008), <https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Massive
Resistance>.
50. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
51. Peter Mackinnon, President of SEIU Local 509 in Massachusetts, said after the Janus
ruling:
Today, the Supreme Court came down on the wrong side of history in a case that
the rich and powerful are hoping will divide us. But no court case is going to stop
us from fighting for the strong unions our communities need. By joining together
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proposed changes to 150E reveal a cynical desire to protect only the
interests of a subset of public employees - those who agree with the
union's political positions which just so happen to coincide with the
elected officials who drafted the proposed amendments to the state
labor statute.
This sort of resistance - always understood as "we will do what
we want to in spite of what any court says the law is" - is a
fundamentally undemocratic, sore loser response. In a functioning
democracy, each faction expects to lose - at least every so often.
Refusing to lose gracefully and to adjust to the post-Janus
environment is a profoundly unattractive and disturbing role for one
of the first democratic legislative bodies in the country to occupy.

in unions, working people have the strength to raise wages, secure basic needs like
healthcare coverage, improve jobs, and make life better for communities.
Massachusetts Labor Responds to Janus v. AFSCME Supreme Court Ruling, SAMPAN (June 27,
2018), <https://sampan.org/2018/06/massachusetts-labor-responds-to-janus-vs-afscme-supremecourt-ruling/>.

